

2007 Turkish Cruise

Supplementary Materials

- **Newsletter #1**
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- **NYT Article: "The East in the West"**
 - **"The Geopolitics of Turkey"**
 - **Letoön, Xanthus and Patara**



Newsletter # 1

August 16, 2007

Dear Turkey Cruise Participants:

With just about two months to go before the first participants leave for Istanbul, we want to share some information which will help you with your planning.

Peter and Kazim Uzunoglu have been performing miracles trying to keep track of the many different details of each cruise participant's schedules and preferences. It has been a truly Herculean task, but we believe that they have been able to accommodate a wide variety of wishes, and that thanks to them the logistics of the cruise will go off smoothly. We all owe them a vote of thanks.

We hope that many of you have had a chance to start reading up on the country and the areas where you will be traveling and sailing. If not, the reading list is posted on the CCA Website, on the pages for the Turkey Cruise. I also recommend that you follow current news on developments in Turkey. This summer has been a time of dynamic movements here, with fascinating political developments which have raised many issues close to the heart of modern Turks. It is truly a work in progress, and each step opens new doors and raises new questions. In the main, though, you will be coming to Turkey at a time of a rapidly expanding economy, a new awareness of its relationship with the world, an evolving sense of what democracy and secularism mean to the country, and a new place in the geopolitical scene.

At the same time, many of the world's major newspapers and travel magazines have also been featuring articles on Turkey, and Istanbul in particular. If you have seen any of these, they should have whetted your appetite for your visit. Those of you who have never been here before will discover that Turkey is something of an undiscovered treasure; many people traveling to Turkey for the first time find that they want to return to explore it more.

Following are a number of items of important information, some of which require a response. Please read through them carefully and get back to me if you have any questions:

1. **What to Wear:** Comfortable, casual clothing is all you will need for the entire trip. There is no need for anything dressy or formal. Skirts or slacks are fine for women, and we recommend covered shoulders. Autumn is one of Turkey's loveliest seasons, with warm days and cool evenings, but there is always the possibility of rain. Thus, you should bring sweaters, windbreakers and rain gear. Since the first part of the trip is shore-based, we also recommend a good pair of walking shoes.

2. **Cruise Apparel:** Stars Signatures has a variety of shirts, jackets, caps, bags, etc. with the cruise logo. If interested, please contact them directly at <http://www.starssignatures.com/embroidery.php?page=Club:ClubHomePage&clubIdentifier=turkey2007>
3. **Copies of Passports:** Kazim tells us that some arrangements (particularly hotel and flight check-ins) can be made much more easily if he has copies of the ID pages of each participant's passport. *Please send copies to Peter* at: PO Box 7205, Portland, ME 04112-7205, or scanned copies to pchandler@bnn CPA.com.
4. **Copies of Documents:** Please make copies of all your important documents - passport, air tickets, visas, credit cards, etc. - and carry them with you in a separate location. These copies are invaluable in the event that you need to replace any of your important papers.
5. **Insurance:** It is highly recommended that you purchase trip cancellation insurance which covers your investment in the event you, an immediate family member, your traveling companion, or key business associate, become ill and require you to cancel your trip. Inexpensive accident insurance covers unexpected expenses due to an emergency or to get you home in case you can't make it on your own. We recommend you check with your health care provider regarding coverage outside the U.S. Please note that Medicare does not provide coverage when you are outside of the U.S. We recommend that you check http://www.medexassist.com/travmed_globe.cfm for more information and a comprehensive medical insurance coverage.
6. **Visas:** Please note that you must have a Visitor's Visa to enter Turkey. These can be purchased for \$20 (cash!) at the Visa Desk just before Passport Control. It is a very efficient process, and the Visa Desk is clearly marked, but don't make the mistake of entering the Passport Control line without a visa. You will be sent back.
7. **Spiritual Matters:**
 - a. Please note that individuals will be responsible for paying for their own wine and beer at all meals except the dinner at Ephesus, the Commodore's Cocktail Party, and the Closing Dinner at Phaselis.
 - b. Although widely available, alcohol is quite expensive in Turkey. Our advice is to bring whatever hard liquor you prefer, or to purchase it at our favorite liquor store, the Duty Free shop next to Baggage Claim at Atatürk Airport. Turkish Customs allows you to import up to 5 liters, but limit sales at the Duty Free shop to 2 liters per passport.
 - c. Efes, the most widely available Turkish beer, is very good. Turkish wines are generally quite good, but are no longer the bargain they used to be. Recently, some excellent new varietals have come on the market.
 - d. Mount Gay, sad to report, is not available in Turkey, even at Duty Free. Plan accordingly!
8. **Crew Lists (for bareboat charterers only):** Please find on the website a copy of the Crew List form required by the charter companies. Please enter all required information concerning your crew members; we will complete the information concerning the boats. *This should be printed out, completed and returned to Peter* at: PO Box 7205, Portland, ME 04112-7205, or scanned copies to pchandler@bnn CPA.com, as soon as possible.
9. **Sailing History (for bareboat charterers only):** European charter companies normally require a sailing license, not normally available in the US, as proof of competency in order to be able to charter. In its place, the person in whose name the charter is listed must submit a brief history of his/her sailing experience (as would be

required for any bareboat charter). There is a form on the website. *This, too, should be sent to Peter* as soon as possible.

10. **For Group 1 and Group 2 Participants:** Tania is an expert on Istanbul's Grand (or Covered) Bazaar - see <http://www.guideistanbul.net/carsi.htm>. She would be happy to lead tours through the Bazaar, and to recommend reliable vendors. Please let her know if you would be interested in participating in such a tour, and what goods you would particularly be interested in seeing or buying. Her address is tchandler@robcol.k12.tr.


11. **For Group 1 Participants only:** We need to know the following:

- a. **Balloon Ride in Cappadocia:** Kazim needs to know how many people are interested in participating in balloon rides. Although expensive, this is truly a once-in-a-lifetime experience and highly recommended. Please contact him directly at kazim@baltactours.com if you want to sign up.
- b. **Boatyard Tour in Tuzla:** The town of Tuzla, on the northern shore of the Marmara Sea, about 45 minutes from downtown Istanbul, is a center of all kinds of boat-building, including boats built by Ted Hood, several major Italian designers, and others. The widely publicized mega-yacht *Maltese Falcon* was built last year at a Tuzla yard. If there is sufficient interest, a tour of several of the leading yards can be organized. Please let John know at jchandler@robcol.k12.tr if you would be interested in participating.

As always, please feel to write if you have questions or need further information. We're looking forward to seeing you.

Best wishes,

John and Tania Chandler



Newsletter #2

September 15, 2007

Dear Turkey Cruise Participants:

We thought the following information, drawn largely from Kazim's extensive experience as well as our observations during the last CCA Turkish Cruise, might be of help as you start to focus on the details of your upcoming trip. Please copy and forward to those members of your crew who are not CCA members, as most will not be able to access the Cruise Website.

At this writing, Kazim is fine-tuning the itinerary and confirming all the arrangements for tours, meals, etc. You will receive a detailed version upon arrival.

DOCUMENTS

A valid passport is required for travel to Turkey.

Although this was mentioned in the last newsletter, questions received from participants since then suggest that it bears repeating that **you do not need to purchase a Visitor's Visa before arriving in Turkey**. These are available on arrival at any international airport in Turkey at the Visa Desk **before** Passport Control. The cost is \$20 US. It is a simple procedure and takes about 10 seconds. The \$20 fee is payable in cash only.

Please make copies of all your important documents - passport, air tickets, visas, credit cards, etc. - and carry them with you in a separate location. These copies are invaluable in the event that you need to replace any of your important papers.

U.S. CUSTOMS

Although in practice we have never had a problem with this, U.S. Customs offices advise that foreign items of significant value, such as cameras and binoculars, should be registered with Customs before departure to avoid paying duty when you return. International airports supply forms for itemizing your valuables which are then identified and inspected by a Customs agent. When you return, simply show the form to Customs.

At this writing, each U.S. citizen can import \$800 worth of foreign goods duty free. Consult with your local Customs officials to learn what restrictions pertain to certain items. Many of the items from developing countries can be brought in duty free, but there are mixed reports on inconsistency in treatment by Customs officials regarding weavings and rugs. Be prepared to pay duty (cash or travelers checks) on a large rug purchase. We advise that you obtain a clearly written receipt for any expensive item. Almost all reputable vendors, particularly of carpets, can provide such a receipt in English.

PRE-TRIP HEALTH AND MEDICAL

Known Medical Conditions

Excellent health care is available in the major Turkish cities, and emergency care will be available along our travel routes. However, it would be helpful if you could advise us of any known medical conditions of which you believe we should be aware in the event of an emergency. Ideally, contact information for your own primary care physician should also be included, in case an attending doctor needs to communicate with him/her. Please send any information to John at jchandler@robcol.k12.tr.

Please note: Neither CCA nor Baltaç Tours can be held responsible for cruise participants' health problems during any portion of the planned trip and cruise.

Immunizations

Although no special inoculations are required for travel to Turkey, current tetanus and diphtheria protection is recommended. In addition, a Hepatitis A immunization is recommended but not a must, just prior to departure. Please consult your physician for current information concerning typhoid immunization, now available in an oral form.

Prescriptions

If you wear prescription glasses, it is highly recommended you have a spare pair and a copy of the prescription with you. You may wish to bring a pair of prescription sunglasses, as the Mediterranean sun can be intense.

Make sure you have a sufficient supply of any medication you take on a regular basis (what you need may not be available in Turkey), accompanied by a doctor's prescription.

INSURANCE

As noted in the previous newsletter, it is highly recommended that you purchase trip cancellation insurance which covers your investment in the event that circumstances beyond your control require you to cancel your trip.

Inexpensive accident insurance covers unexpected expenses due to an emergency or to get you home in case you can't make it on your own. We also recommend that you check with your health care provider regarding coverage outside the U.S. Please note that Medicare does not provide coverage when you are outside of the U.S. We recommend that you check http://www.medexassist.com/travmed_globe.cfm for more information and a comprehensive medical insurance coverage.

Baggage insurance - check with your insurance agent to learn if your homeowners' insurance covers your possessions while traveling. Sometimes items are excluded from theft if they were not at your home at time of theft. Travel baggage insurance would reimburse you for some losses in the event your baggage goes astray, is misplaced, or stolen. Turkey is very safe, but things can happen. Better safe than sorry.

WHAT TO BRING

Money and Important Papers

You will need:

- Passport: valid for at least six months after your return to the U.S.
- An additional photo ID, which can be the copy you have made of the photo page of your passport. A driver's license is also acceptable.
- Airline tickets.
- Travelers' checks. We do not recommend bringing travelers' checks, except as an emergency reserve. Cashing them outside of the major tourist areas is very difficult. ATM machines are plentiful everywhere we will be traveling, and are much easier to use (see also "Credit Cards," below).
- Credit Cards. Most stores and supermarkets take Visa or MasterCard. The American Express card is less widely accepted due to very high commissions. Furthermore, AmEx credit cards are not represented in Turkey. Major purchases such as large or especially fine carpets can, and perhaps should, be made with a credit card. If you are contemplating major carpet shopping, be sure you bring a card with sufficient limit and unused credit! **Important:** Please notify your bank that you will be traveling in Turkey and make sure that your credit and ATM cards are cleared to make purchases and/or withdrawals. You should also bring contact information for your bank should there be a problem using your credit card. This has happened in the past.
- US Dollars. Bring some ones and fives for tips and other miscellaneous needs. Cash is always king (see also "Changing Money in Turkey," below).

- Money belt or other secure means of carrying cash and valuable documents.
- Leave your fancy wallet or purse, jewels, and flashy valuables at home. You will not need the library card, multiple bank cards, a video club card, or any jewelry.

You will need money for:

- Meals which are not included, or drinks for those meals which are included.
- Visa stamp upon entry.
- Tips for guide, crew, drivers, etc, at your discretion. Tipping guidelines are included below.
- Personal expenses such as laundry, phone calls, or snacks.
- Souvenirs and shopping.

CHANGING MONEY IN TURKEY

Do not bother buying Turkish Lira before arrival. It is a waste of time and money.

The New Turkish Lira (YTL) is a convertible currency, therefore it is very easy to change your dollars. Currently 1 USD averages 1.32 YTL. The easiest way, with the least hassle and the best rate, is to use the "change bureaus" (in Turkish, "Döviz") that are conveniently located at the airport and in tourist areas, almost in every block! You can also change money at banks but, depending on the time of the day, you might have to wait in a line. Hotel rates are always the worst, but the time saved may be worth the difference. You can also use your ATM card to withdraw local currency at machines bearing the sign of your system, but beware of the additional charge your bank may charge you for each ATM transaction in a foreign country. Credit cards are widely accepted. You will find that most businesses, and even taxi drivers, will be thrilled to take your greenbacks at the current rate of exchange. See also the section on Travelers' Checks (above).

LUGGAGE

Take as little as possible! Remember that you will have to help keep track of your things, so pack lightly. Attire is almost always informal so we need very little variety. If you bring little with you, you have room to take lots back!

The baggage limit for international flights is usually two checked pieces weighing no more than 70 pounds each, but individual airlines' policies vary. Usually carry-on items are not weighed, however each airline has its own unique policy. Overweight baggage is

often charged an extra fee. Baggage restrictions change frequently. Please check with the airline before departure.

Remember that we will stay in a number of hotels. Although portage is included, keep your inventory of "stuff-to-be-managed" as simple as possible.

Be sure your identification tags are on the outside of your bags and that there is clear identification inside as well. If the outside tags disappear, and a bag becomes orphaned, the "Lost Bag Hounds" can find the owner's name and address inside and speed it along its way back to you.

Rule of thumb: maintain as low an economic profile as you can tolerate. Do not bring fancy luggage, as it attracts thieves and may get abused. If your luggage has locks, be sure that they can be opened by airline/security personnel. Otherwise, they may be broken, particularly on transatlantic legs. An inexpensive short-term theft and lost baggage insurance policy is **HIGHLY RECOMMENDED** for ease of mind.

We recommend checking your baggage through to your destination city. **When you check your bag, BE SURE that it has been tagged for the CORRECT CITY.**

Be sure to carry all documents, money, passports, camera, prescription medications and other items of value in your carry-on bag. If you also carry on some clothing and toiletries, you will be prepared in case your checked baggage is lost or delayed. If you can carry on everything, so much the better.

In the case of lost luggage, immediately contact the airline personnel and file a lost luggage form. Most airlines will supply some money to shop for lost clothing, etc., but you may have to argue firmly for this. If you need to provide an address for delivery of lost luggage, we suggest that you use:

c/o John Chandler
Robert College of Istanbul
Kurucesme Caddesi No: 87
34345 Arnavutkoy-Istanbul
(212) 359-2212

Kazim has also arranged with the Armada Hotel for a storage room where you can leave any bags or purchases during the cruise portion of the trip (available only for those spending the night of November 3rd at the Armada).

EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING

A detailed list of suggestions follows. There is always room for individuality, as long as you can carry it.

1. Good sunglasses, either polarized or coated (extra pair advised), or prescription sunglasses.
2. Elastic adjustable strap to hold sunglasses on.
3. Extra or old pair of prescription glasses or contacts, if you wear them.
4. Binoculars (not required but highly recommended).
5. Photo Equipment (pack in your carry-on luggage):
 - a. Camera and lenses. An assortment of lenses is useful. If you have two cameras, consider bringing them both - we all know that cameras cease to function once they reach maximum distance from service facilities! Ultraviolet (UV) and polarizing filters are desirable.
 - b. **EXTRA CAMERA BATTERIES: The vast majority of camera problems that occur while traveling are due to low or exhausted batteries. Bring at least 2 extra sets of batteries for your camera.**
 - c. **Lots of film or additional memory sticks for digital cameras.** Regular ASA 100 positive film for prints is available all over Turkey at competitive prices close to the US prices. However if you are taking slides, it might be hard to find and also expensive in Turkey, so bring all that you will need, an assortment of films for varying conditions - ASA 50, 100, 200 and 400 for early morning, late afternoon and inside shots. Budget at least 2 rolls/day.
 - d. Lens brush and paper.
 - e. Bag to keep camera DRY, as salt water rapidly corrodes delicate camera parts. Ziplocks do nicely.
 - f. Remember that standard electrical service in Turkey is 220 volt (same as in the Continental Europe). Be sure your charger is multi-voltage (most are, but check yours!).
7. Pocket calculator for monetary conversions, transactions and exchanges (nice but not necessary).
8. Electrical plug adapter - Turkey uses a unique plug system. Turkey, like Europe, uses 220V AC current.

Clothing List

Clothing requirements differ from cities to coastal resort towns. "Smart casual" is generally fine in the cities. Beachwear should be reserved for the coast. Shorts (and short skirts) should not be worn in mosques - however there is always someone at the entrances of mosques offering the temporary use of simple skirts and headscarves to be worn when inside the mosque. Women are encouraged to bring a headscarf for mosque visits.

Bring wash and wear items. The air is dry and hand laundry dries quickly. Hotel laundry service can be stunningly expensive!

Miscellaneous

- Small bottle of Woolite for overnight handwashing of clothes.
- Insect repellent
- Sun block SPF 30 or higher (available, but expensive, in Turkey)

FLAGS:

Almost all charter boats are not equipped with masthead flag halyards. Thus, please do not bother trying to bring pig-sticks and burgees. Those wishing to show CCA colors can obtain a Member Aboard pennant (see <http://www.sailbaglady.com/cruising-club.html>), which can be flown from the starboard spreader, below the courtesy flag if the boat is registered outside of Turkey (many are).

WEATHER

Cappadocia & Turquoise Coast

Average daytime temperatures south of Istanbul range from the 70's to the upper 80's, depending on the time of year. In October nights can be cool. In Cappadocia, nights tend to be cooler after sunset. Sporadic rain is possible so rain gear is a must.

Istanbul & Izmir areas

Istanbul and Izmir daytime temperatures average 65° - 75° in October, correspondingly cooler at night.

Supplies

Although many of these items can be bought in Turkey, there is no guarantee that you will have the time or desire to shop for them.

1. Toiletries as you see fit. Here are some suggestions.

- a. Washcloth. Most hotels and charter boats do not provide them.
 - b. Moisturizer.
 - c. Chapstick.
 - d. Aspirin, Advil (Ibuprofen), or other such pain reliever.
 - e. Moleskin, to cushion those possibly up-and-coming blisters.
 - f. Tampons and/or other for those who may need them.
 - g. Kleenex.
 - h. Mosquito repellent - For the few mosquitoes you may encounter, a citronella based repellent is recommended as the safest on your skin. Those with DEET are most effective but should not be used directly on the skin, apply it to clothing instead.
 - i. Shave kit, for those who use one.
 - j. Nail clippers.
 - k. Your favorite brand of toothpaste.
- 2. Any medication that you may need.
 - 3. Small, personal first aid kit, containing items such as Band-Aids, swabs and tweezers. Of course, if two or more are traveling together, one kit will do for the group.
 - 4. Sunscreen, minimum 30 SPF. **This is very important**, since so much time on the trip is spent outside under the intense Mediterranean sun. There is always zinc oxide, which comes in many exciting colors.
 - 5. Motion sickness remedies.
 - 6. Pepto Bismol or Imodium to help relieve digestive problems (tablet or liquid).
 - 7. Clothing care items such as clothespins, sewing kit and a small amount of laundry soap. There is laundry service at some hotels but, it can be **expensive**.

8. Some toilet paper for emergencies. Even in the cities it may be very handy. Of course, a pack of tissues does just fine.
9. Eye mask, earplugs and inflatable neck rest for sleeping on flights. Sometimes noise or simply changing environments can rob one of sleep.
10. Notebook or journal to record your impressions and experiences. One with pockets enables you to save colorful entrance tickets and other mementos in an organized fashion.
11. Field guides and leisure reading about Turkey.
12. Turkish language and phrase book.
13. If you are a vegetarian, especially a strict vegetarian, you may elect to bring some of your favorite snacks with you. Turkey is a country of abundant produce, seasonal fruits, vegetables and a large variety of grains, fish, red meat, chicken and more. At every meal, there will be a wide selection of grains, legumes, salads and vegetables, so vegetarians are unlikely to have problems.

A NOTE ABOUT DRINKING WATER

We strongly recommend drinking only bottled water, even in 5 Star hotels. Bottles of all sizes are available everywhere in Turkey, at very reasonable prices.

GUIDELINES FOR TIPPING AND ADDITIONAL EXPENSES

Baltaç Tours does not include tips as part of the trip price. We have found that when tips are included, service suffers as the incentive to excel has been diminished. Tipping is customary but not obligatory. It reflects the acknowledgement of quality service. Wages earned by tourism and restaurant service staffs are kept low by their employers with the expectation that superior performance will result in a relatively equitable income. The suggested amounts reflect current practice. You are invited to increase or decrease the amounts based on how you have experienced the service you received on this adventure. It is suggested that you pay cash as personal checks and credit cards will not be practical for tipping.

TIPS

Drivers	\$ 5.00 - \$ 6.00 per person per day
Guides	\$ 8.00 - \$10.00 per person per day

Meals: Check the bill, or ask the waiter, to see if the tip ("Servis") is included. As a general rule, a tip of 10% is considered acceptable, more if you feel the quality of service warrants it.

COMMUNICATION

Turkish is a difficult language and, while any Turk will greatly appreciate your efforts to master even a few words, you will be able to get by with English just about everywhere you will be going on this trip. We highly recommend a phrase book, however.

LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE

International calls are universally expensive when charged to your hotel room. It is highly recommended that you bring an international long distance calling card such as AT&T USA Direct, MCI or Sprint. MCI, Sprint and AT&T USA Direct service is available from all public, private and cellular telephones and from most hotel rooms. Those who plan to be using computers may also want to open a Skype account and to bring a headset. Those who have Blackberries, or the equivalent, should check to make sure that they will work in Turkey.

CELLULAR TELEPHONES

GSM system cell phones are widely used in Turkey and there are 3 national networks, namely Turkcell, Vodafone and Avea. If you are planning to bring your cell phone, check with your network provider about your roaming status with GSM systems. Turkcell is the biggest and has the best reception all over Turkey. You can also rent a cell phone at the Istanbul Airport with a prepaid account.

As noted above, those who have Blackberries, or the equivalent, should check to make sure that they will work in Turkey.

INTERNET ACCESS

If you are planning to bring your own laptop computer, you will be able to gain access to the Internet from most hotel rooms. If you use AOL, local service numbers in Turkey should be listed in your AOL software under international phone numbers.

Internet cafés are ubiquitous in Turkey. Not all of them are particularly appealing, but decent ones can be found in Göcek, Fethiye, Kaş and Kalkan along the cruise route.

TURKEY EMERGENCY CONTACT LIST

We suggest that you leave a copy of your itinerary and this Emergency Contact List with someone at home so friends or family can reach you in an emergency.

Keep in mind that Turkey is 2 hours ahead of London, 7 hours ahead of the US East Coast, and 10 hours ahead of the West Coast.

This list will be reprinted in the Cruise Book.

EMERGENCY NUMBERS

JOHN CHANDLER'S CELL PHONE	011 90 532 655-2420
KAZIM UZUNOGLU'S CELL PHONE	011 90 532 284-2552
JOHN'S OFFICE	011 90 212 359-2212
KAZIM'S OFFICE	011 90 212-233-0075
EMERGENCY – AMBULANCE	112
POLICE	155
TRAFFIC POLICE	154
JANDARMA (MILITARY POLICE)	156
FIRE	110
US EMBASSY ANKARA	0(312) 455-5555
US CONSULATE ISTANBUL	0(212) 335-9000
US CONSULAR AGENT IZMIR	0(232) 464-8755

September 25, 2005
The East in the West
By CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

On a warm Saturday night, beneath the cable car that runs up into the mountains from a quiet neighborhood in the historic Ottoman city of Bursa, the Teleferik Family Tea Garden is mobbed. Whole families from the farthest reaches of Anatolia, the Asian part of Turkey, are crowded around tables in front of glasses of tea, watching a pair of guys with a keyboard sing arabesques and rock songs in Kurdish. The families have arrived in the past few years, a cashier explains, from Tunceli, a town at the epicenter of the terrorist campaign against the Turkish state that Kurdish guerrillas waged from 1984 to 1999. Most of the young women wear the loose-fitting headscarves traditional in Turkey; others, the more elaborate and constraining ones that are a mark of newer currents in political Islam. Still others are on the dance floor, uncovered, bare-armed, dancing in an implausibly immodest way they have probably seen on videos. None of the boys are far enough removed from village mores to dare join them. Watching the dancers impassively, their mothers, in headscarves and long rain jackets despite the heat, smoke cigarettes and chatter on cellphones.

This jostling together of European fads, age-old rural folkways and Islamic fervor has been a fact of Turkish life for a long time, especially in big provincial cities like Bursa. Imitating Europe was already an Ottoman project when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923. But thereafter, the Europeanization of its citizens became the state's mission, its *raison d'être* even. This meant modernizing industry, mores and the Turkish language. Mostly it meant pushing Islam out of the public square. There were bans on headscarves in university classes and at state jobs. There were government-trained imams who gave government-issued sermons on Fridays. Elites tended to approve Atatürk's vision; when they didn't, a huge standing army could be summoned to defend it.

And yet even as Turkey prepares to open membership negotiations with the European Union next week, the country's Europeanizing mission has been challenged, both at home and abroad. Turkey started petitioning for admission to the European Union's precursor organizations nearly half a century ago. Until the late 1990's, Europe wasn't interested. But embarrassed by persistent Turkish accusations that they were running a "Christian club," Europe's bureaucrats softened their stance. If Turkey could democratize according to the so-called Copenhagen criteria - by getting the army out of politics, eliminating the death penalty and expanding freedom of speech and religion, among other things - it could seek full E.U. membership. Turkey has complied, mostly. At a summit meeting last winter, the E.U. agreed to start talks this Oct. 3. There was cause for satisfaction on both sides. Turkey would get a ratification of its European identity from Europe itself. Europe would get a closer partnership with an economically dynamic Muslim country that has a long track record of keeping religious enthusiasm under control.

It looked different to the European on the street. French and Dutch voters rejected the union's proposed constitution last spring, citing worries about immigrant labor. A poll by the E.U.'s Eurobarometer service showed only 35 percent of Europeans favoring Turkish accession. So now, on the eve of negotiations, European politicians are looking for a face-saving way to leave Turkey at the altar. The French prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, spoke out in

favor of delaying talks unless Turkey recognized the Greek part of Cyprus, which Turkey sees as a new condition. Germany's Christian Democrat leader, Angela Merkel, asked Turkey to be content with a "privileged partnership" rather than member status. It is not likely that Turks will consider that prize worth the self-abasement. Earlier this month, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told *The Economist*: "Should they propose anything short of full membership or any new conditions, we will walk away. And this time it will be for good."

What is unclear is where Turkey would walk away to. Back to its American ally, from whom the Iraq war has estranged it? Into ad hoc pacts with its neighbors Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia? Or into the embrace of the worldwide Muslim umma? Maybe the failure of Turkey's E.U. candidacy could even cause Turks to renounce altogether their century-old aspiration of making themselves ever more European.

The Cultural Contradictions of Kemalism

Since the end of the cold war, the lid has come off Turkish life. Turkey's population is growing by nearly a million people a year, even as emigration to Europe continues. Suat Kiniklioglu, who heads the Turkish office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, says, "Urban Turkey is being overrun by the countryside." Take Bursa. In the 1980's, the city had fewer than a million people. Now it is at 1.5 million and swelling daily with newcomers from both the surrounding villages and places like Tunceli. The western edge of Bursa is as modern and European as any place in Turkey, with malls, trimmed lawns, "Beware of Dog" signs and the Renault and Fiat plants that are the backbone of the country's auto industry. But some of the newer apartment blocks near the Teleferik Family Tea Garden are home to people who work for village-level wages, practice a village-level piety and give their votes to the three-year-old Islamist government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party.

Maybe "Islamist" is a simplistic way of putting it, but maybe not. What Erdogan has sought to do since his party came to power in 2002 is to resolve some of the cultural contradictions of Ataturk's republic. The Turkish state has always tried to imitate the ways of Western democracies, but without giving the country's Muslim middle and lower-middle classes much voice in the matter. Turkey's masses are pious even by the standards of the Islamic world, though their piety has mostly been a private one, bearing scant resemblance to the authoritarian fundamentalism of the Saudi Wahhabis or the Iranian Khomeinists. For almost all of the last century, they were too distant, too poor and too disorganized to demand a hearing. Yet whenever society has reclaimed a bit of power or freedom from the Turkish state, it has done so in the name of Islam or, at the very least, of traditional Turkish values. In a Turkish context, more democracy generally means more Islam.

The lesson has never been lost on Erdogan. In 1994, the Welfare Party, founded by the hard-line Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, swept big-city mayoral races across the country. Erdogan, who as a young man led the youth wing of a precursor to the Welfare Party, became mayor of Istanbul. The key to his success was that there were 11 million people living in and around Istanbul, six times the population of three decades before. Empty lots and unclaimed fields had filled up with houses and apartments known as *gece kondu* - a Turkish expression that means, roughly, "thrown up overnight." The devout, dirt-poor and disoriented new arrivals found in Erdogan a mayor who was one of them. It was not just that he himself had grown up a poor provincial in Istanbul (his family were sailors from the Black Sea) or that he had sold *simit* (Turkey's ubiquitous singed sesame bread rings) on street corners to pay for his

schoolbooks or that his mighty baritone had made him a sought-after muezzin or that he eschewed alcohol (and even tried as mayor to ban it from the touristy neighborhood of Beyoglu). The new arrivals also respected him because he was a formidable organizer. He had studied management and understood how a modern municipality worked. In an era of endemic official corruption, he was accessible and relatively transparent. He was a maestro at bringing electricity and running water into the gece kondu and garbage and sewage out.

That first round of Turkish Islamism flamed out. When the Iranian ambassador sang the praises of fundamentalism at a public rally, the army sent tanks into the street. This "postmodern coup," as it is called, eventually resulted in Erbakan's resignation and the banning of his party. Erdogan, meanwhile, was arrested, jailed and stripped of his mayoralty in 1998 for publicly reciting a poem about bayonets and minarets.

But events cut in Erdogan's favor. The 1997 coup did not do what it was meant to. It brought a wave of corruption that discredited all the establishment political parties. As 2000 turned to 2001, Turkey underwent a banking collapse and then a currency crash. Erdogan broke with Erbakan and founded the Justice and Development Party, or A.K.P., in 2001 with the help of secular centrist politicians. He won an overwhelming parliamentary majority in elections the following year. He entered office in 2003 (once a ban on his holding office had been lifted) in very good shape. An International Monetary Fund bailout package gave him a road map for economic revival that he followed punctiliously. His mix of market economics and social conservatism won the support of newly prosperous Muslim entrepreneurs in the Anatolian heartland. And the perennial problem faced by any conservative Turkish politician - wooing the Muslim base while not scaring the staunchly secular army - was simplified greatly by Turkey's E.U. candidacy, which has always been understood to stand or fall on society's ability to keep the military out of public life.

Freedom and the Headscarf

Since Sept. 11, the West's biggest question about Turkey has been whether it forms part of the problem of an increasingly militant Islam or part of the solution. The E.U.'s rationale for welcoming Turkey into its councils and its economic sphere used to be a matter of "strategic rent," compensation for its position at a crossroads of continents and military blocs. Today, says Soli Ozel, a political scientist at Bilgi University, what Europe sees in Turkey is "an example that a modern, secular democratic state and capitalist society is compatible with a Muslim population." Europe has come to value Turkey not just for where it is but for what it is.

About a third of the Justice and Development Party's support comes from liberals who joined it in hopes that Erdogan's commitment to the European project would bring them visa-free travel, investment opportunities or equality for women. It is an open question which part of Erdogan's coalition is the dog and which the tail. He has shown signs of wanting to coax hard-line Islamists into the modernizing consensus. He has also shown signs of using Europe as a means to weaken the army to the point where he can pursue untrammelled an Islamist agenda of the sort he espoused a decade or two ago.

One of Erdogan's notorious pronouncements during his term as Istanbul mayor was that democracy was like a streetcar: "You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off." In the old days, he was one of those Islamist politicians who would not shake a woman's hand. Turkey's secular order still poses problems in his personal life - there have been state

functions that his headscarf-wearing wife could not attend. And even as he has sought to Europeanize Turkey's political structures, he has lost few opportunities to Islamicize its social ones. Weeks before his visit to Brussels last December to make the final push for the start of Turkey's accession talks, he tried to change Turkish law to criminalize adultery. The A.K.P. has all but destroyed Turkey's fledgling wine industry with punitive taxes. And Erdogan has decriminalized "clandestine" Koran courses, even though they have been a meeting place for radicals of the Iran-backed Turkish Hezbollah movement.

Erdogan harps on the need for religious freedom - American-style religious freedom. Last year he explained to a German newspaper that secularism as the French understand it (i.e., as a state ideology) was not the Turkish way. "We Turks," he explained, "are closer to the Anglo-Saxon understanding of secularism" (i.e., as religious freedom). As regards the government, this assertion is preposterous: the Turkish system was not just inspired by, but copied from, the French. As regards the public, he is probably right. The increasing visibility of religion in Turkey has many of the same sources that it does in the United States. In a recent Pew poll that asked why Islam's role is increasing, the largest reason cited (by more than a third of Turks) was the "growing immorality in our society."

Erdogan opposes abortion and contraception, both of which are legal. But Turkey's hot-button issues of religion and state concern whether university women and civil servants should be permitted to wear the headscarf and whether young men who attend religious schools should be allowed to transfer their credentials to nonreligious programs. These pit the parliamentarians of Erdogan's party against the Higher Education Council, which appoints rectors who can veto laws that threaten universities' secular orientation. The council was established by the military government in 1980, when radical leftist and radical rightist students were murdering one another by the literal thousands. But over time, public patience with such supervision erodes. "Suppose the scarf is a political symbol against the secular republic," says Nazli Ilıcak, a newspaper owner and columnist and an ally of Erdogan since before his A.K.P. days. "There is still no harm in their going to university. If you are against religion, let them go! They'll get more emancipated and have their own jobs."

More and more Turks share Ilıcak's view that Islam and its symbols are compatible with modernity, are perhaps even a sign of modernity: a woman who aroused no comment on a goat path migrates to a city and stands out when she takes a computer class or sits in Starbucks. "It's not that people are more religious," says Can Paker, a businessman and analyst at Tesev, an Istanbul policy center. "It's that they are more free." And free, upwardly mobile women may choose to wear the veil for a variety of reasons. It can be a sign of solidarity with the family or small town left behind. It can be a marker of membership in a new rising elite. It can be simply chic. After all, the prime minister's wife wears one.

Sunni Rotarianism

Calls for veiling and more religious instruction are modern in another way. They reflect the increasing economic clout of provincial Muslims. Before the Ottoman Empire collapsed and its ethnic populations were reshuffled, most businessmen were Christians and Jews. It has taken a long time for the Muslims who took over their functions to build up father-and-son firms into big national and international ones. But now they have done it, aided by a kind of Sunni Rotarianism. Muslim obligations of zakat, or charitable tithing, inevitably turn the country's rural businessmen into important community leaders and lead them into clubby (and formal) fraternal arrangements. The challenge to political establishments posed by powerful

entrepreneurs espousing traditional values is familiar from the American Sun Belt or the Canadian or Australian west.

A natural affinity is developing between Erdogan's party and the most innovative sectors of the economy. For years, the centralized Turkish state bought social peace by creating jobs in state-backed industries, which are now a drag on the economy. About a sixth of the work force is still in the public sector, and its interests are protected by aggressive unions. The A.K.P.'s voters, however, are almost by definition outsiders to this statist system and have no stake in defending it.

No political party in Turkey has ever found itself more often in the Thatcherite role. Erdogan fought the public-sector paper company SEKA, which used to dump tons of chlorine into the Bay of Izmit while losing tons of money. Despite a 51-day occupation of the factory by militant workers, he succeeded in closing down the plant. He is now fighting to privatize Erdemir, the public steel company - a fight that pits him not only against Erdemir's unions but also against supporters of the army, who have argued for its strategic importance. When Erdogan visited Diyarbakir, an impoverished eastern city, in August, a heckler called on him to build more factories. "Listen, my friend," Erdogan replied, according to a report in the English-language Turkish Daily News. "The A.K.P. government will not build any factories here." Instead he promoted a new enterprise-zone law his government had passed, which offered tax rebates and utility discounts to private companies. "What else do you want?" he asked. "Don't get used to freebies."

The provincial cities where Sunni Rotarianism flourishes - Denizli, Gaziantep, Urfa, Konya and others - are called the Anatolian Tigers. One of the more important is the 5,000-year-old Silk Road trading town Kayseri, which now makes furniture, beds, textiles, carpets and denim. Mehmet Ozhaseki, the mayor of Kayseri, is a direct fellow who wears a dapper gray suit and the regulation A.K.P. thick mustache. Close to Erdogan, he is one of the mayors who came to power in the Welfare Party's Islamist wave of 1994. Ozhaseki received 72 percent of the popular vote in the last election. He attributes his success locally to good government and the A.K.P.'s nationally to its perceived freedom from corruption. He says, "People never give their votes saying, 'They can be corrupted like other parties, but at least they're Islamic.'" He notes that the headscarf ranks seventh or eighth when voters are asked what's on their minds; jobs generally top the list.

So what interests Ozhaseki is managing the monsoon of social change. Last year, 139 factories opened in Kayseri, and dozens of 15-story apartment blocks are under construction on Kayseri's outskirts. Kayseri had 100,000 people in the 1950's. It has 750,000 today and will have a million in five years. Traditionally, this growth came from agricultural villages nearby, but now Kayseri is one of many Turkish cities getting not just migrants but also immigrants. Local residents say thousands of Iranians live and work in Kayseri. In Turkey as a whole, estimates of the number of "irregular" immigrants - from Iran, Syria and elsewhere - run as high as a million.

Why Trust Turkey?

Turkey's aspiration to the E.U., its adjustment to the global economy, its booming tourist trade and, now, the first signs of mass immigration - all of these make the country a more porous place than it has been for the past century. But the treatment of Armenians, Greeks, Jews and others remains a sensitive subject. Turkey has been mostly free of the anti-Semitism that is

widespread in all other Muslim countries of the Middle East. But "Mein Kampf" is now a best-seller, on sale in at least a half-dozen low-price Turkish-language editions. The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" is also for sale, and its theses are trumpeted regularly in Vakit, the large-circulation Islamist daily.

In late August, on the eve of important E.U. meetings to iron out Turkey's responsibilities on Cyprus, prosecutors announced that Orhan Pamuk, the country's most acclaimed novelist, would be tried under a law that prohibits denigrating Turks or Turkey. Pamuk had told a Swiss publication in February that "30,000 Kurds were killed here, one million Armenians as well." Many scholars (and the French National Assembly) call the Turkish killings of Armenians between 1915 and 1923 a genocide, but the Turkish state considers it fallout from a civil war. For many Europeans, Pamuk is the embodiment of the kind of Turkey that the E.U. could welcome. The decision of authorities to prosecute him could be a blunder that jeopardizes the country's accession chances, though the blame is likely not Erdogan's. The prosecutor who brought charges against Pamuk - a member of the pre-A.K.P. state bureaucracy - investigated Erdogan himself four years ago for "insulting the state."

If Turkey requires a new way of relating to its neighbors and its minorities, the man most influential in formulating it is likely to be Erdogan's adviser Ahmet Davutoglu, a historian and a specialist in international affairs. Mutatis mutandis, Davutoglu is Turkey's closest equivalent to a neoconservative. That is, as he makes moment-to-moment political judgments, he is never far from considering his country's history and ideals. In Davutoglu's case, the relevant history is that of the Ottoman Empire, and the relevant ideals are the ones that permitted that empire to accommodate (not without friction) a wide range of minorities and subcultures. His scholarly obsession of late has been what German historians call the *Mittellage* - the geographical position that traps certain countries in the cockpit of history. How should such countries face the world?

Part of Davutoglu's answer is to be found in his 2000 book, "Strategic Depth" (not translated into English), in which he urges that Turkey pursue a "zero-problem strategy" with its neighbors. Ataturk's motto was "Peace at home and peace in the world." In the 1990's, Turkey's decision to damp down conflicts with its neighbors, particularly Syria, which had sponsored and sheltered Kurdish guerrillas, helped further its ambitions to enter the E.U. What is new about Davutoglu's formulation is that it looks to Ottoman history for inspiration. "If you want good examples of cultures living in harmony, where do you look?" he asked during an interview in the prime ministry in Ankara in July. "You look to Ottoman cities: Istanbul. . . Sarajevo." He sets great store by the fact that in Ottoman times Turkey was probably the most cosmopolitan place on earth, even if he tends not to dwell on the amount of governmental force that was required to keep the multiethnic empire together.

The practical consequences of a zero-problem strategy have been clearest in the cases of Iran and Syria. Turkey has favored talking with, rather than confronting, Iran over its nuclear

program and has not been prominent among those countries stepping up the pressure on Syria to democratize. Erdogan, insiders suggest, is of the view that Bashar al-Assad of Syria is at heart a reformer and deserves support against elements in Syria's security forces that are responsible both for infiltrating terrorists into Iraq and for assassinating Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister. Assad visited Turkey last year at Erdogan's invitation. Some Turks fear that a good-neighbor policy may be ideological camouflage to move the country's foreign policy in a more Islamist direction. And indeed, the A.K.P.'s supporters would like to see a bit more Muslim solidarity from Turkey. Nazli Ilıcak, for instance, laments that Turkey opposed the Algerian movement for independence from France. "Until the 1960's," she says, "we acted like Europeans toward the Arab world."

That mending fences with your Muslim neighbors could constitute a defection from the West is something that appears not to have occurred to Davutoglu. In his office in July, he seemed affronted by the very suggestion. He called it "ignorant." Turkey, he noted, borders on just as many Christian countries - Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Armenia - as Muslim ones. Closer ties with Christian neighbors are something he positively invites. "Europeans feel if Turkey is part of Europe, Turks will invade," he told me. "I say the opposite: Istanbul will be invaded by Eastern Europe." It is a welcoming vision, even if it is not in line with Gallup's polls of Turkish opinion, which show that the top reason Turks favor belonging to the E.U. is the ability to move to any country in Europe and work there.

The End of the 'Deep State'

In confronting the Erdogan government's efforts to create a more Muslim democracy, the old Turkish order - the army and the Kemalist institutions around it that are often called the "deep state" - must cut against the whole logic of modern economics and life. There is not any sense in which A.K.P. leaders can be considered reactionaries. For all his interest in the past and whatever his level of personal piety, Davutoglu is pitching his vision in the language of multiculturalism and globalization. Erdogan has not only been custodian of Turkey's European ambitions for the last half decade; he is also talking about Americanizing its system of constitutional rights.

Against this, the deep state does not look particularly deep. Its civilian followers man the Turkish equivalent of Rust Belt industries. The army has some historic claim to be the guardian of Turkish institutions and freedoms, including ultimately its democratic ones, but its recent record has been mixed. The 1997 coup capsized the economy, which has been righted only by a combination of the International Monetary Fund's expertise and the A.K.P.'s discipline in following it. World conditions are moving to render the deep state less and less effective as a counterbalance to populist excesses. During the 1980 coup, 180,000 political activists were arrested, dozens were executed and most party leaders were banned from politics for a decade - and the country's largely self-enclosed economy barely felt it. A coup under present circumstances would look very different. Any dip in the currency, for instance, could endanger Turkey's delicate international banking agreements.

It is such concerns - over what the E.U.'s bureaucrats or America's bankers would think - that have provided the real discipline of the A.K.P. These have kept under control a growing anti-Americanism in the party and in the public at large. According to polling by the youth-oriented policy institute ARI Hareketi, 36 percent of Turks think the United States and Turkey are heading toward a war. Last winter, "Metal Storm," a fantasy set in 2007 in which a U.S. invasion of Turkey ends with the nuclear destruction of Washington, became one of the best-

selling novels in Turkish history. Turks are quick to insist that public opinion is not anti-American, only anti-Bush. They recall the standing ovation Bill Clinton got when he addressed the National Assembly in November 1999.

But much anti-Americanism in Turkey could be called "primary" and is unaffected by American behavior one way or the other. The last U.S. ambassador, Eric S. Edelman, who departed in June to replace Douglas Feith as under secretary of defense for policy, was a butt of calumny in the popular press, some of it anti-Semitic. Erdogan often has difficulty trammeling his own ideological reflexes, as when he referred to Iraqis killed in Fallujah as martyrs or when he questioned the legitimacy of Iraq's elections last January or when he accused Israel of "state terrorism" after the assassination of the Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin.

The March 1, 2003, parliamentary vote to deny the United States its request to attack Iraq from Turkish soil was a democratic milestone. Newspapers were filled with impassioned arguments, people wrote angry letters to their parliamentarians and phone lines were jammed at the National Assembly. According to Kiniklioglu of the German Marshall Fund, "People were behaving for the first time as if public opinion affected foreign policy." So Turks now quote resentfully an interview that Paul Wolfowitz, then the deputy defense secretary, gave to CNN-Turk two months later, lamenting that the military "for whatever reason. . . did not play the strong leadership role on that issue." This summer, Foreign Minister Gul - who was acting prime minister at the time of the March 1 vote (since Erdogan was in the final days of his ban from holding office) and supposedly in charge of winning it - said it was a good thing it had failed.

Treason and Paranoia

The recasting of the U.S. relationship and the sudden deterioration of the European one come at a bad time. Over the past year, Kurdish separatists have relaunched their war. Since June 2004, when the Kurdish Workers Party, or P.K.K., announced an end to its five-year cease-fire, more than 100 people have been killed, mostly by remote-control bombs. Mayors have been kidnapped, clandestine chemists blown up making bombs and tourists bombed in the resort town Cesme.

Terrorists enter the country from the Kurdish section of Iraq, Turks claim, where they have safe haven in the Kandil Mountains. One American official admits that there is a grain of truth to this. The U.S. Army has been too busy elsewhere in Iraq to do much about the problem, but Washington is now taking the matter more seriously. Earlier this month, top military officers visited Turkey's highest ranking general to discuss the P.K.K. Now that the United States is in Iraq, Turkish forces can no longer cross the border and sort out the problem themselves. So the frustration is multidimensional. Turks resent the European Union for placing obstacles in the way of a no-holds-barred antiterrorist strategy. They resent Americans for being in Iraq. And they resent themselves for removing themselves from the Kurdish region of Iraq.

Under such circumstances, the basic and perennial Turkish fear is easily reactivated - namely, that foreign countries will gang up and dismember it, as European countries did the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries. According to ARI Hareketi, two-thirds of Turks hold this view. Turks are easily whipped into a panic over threats to the nation. Last spring, there were huge protests, with flags hanging from balconies all over the country, after a flag desecration in the port city Mersin was shown on TV. Alongside this arguably healthy

patriotism are signs of a malevolent nationalism. There have been attempts to lynch people suspected of terrorist ties in Trabzon, on the Black Sea coast, and in Seferihisar, near Cesme.

There is an explicitly nationalist party, the M.H.P., that draws thousands to its meetings atop Mount Erciyes outside Kayseri every summer. This year, Devlet Bahceli, the party's leader, accused the A.K.P. of compromising Turkish sovereignty and giving away Cyprus for the chimera of E.U. membership. "There are dress rehearsals for treason going on," Bahceli proclaimed. But these attitudes go far beyond the M.H.P. Erdogan himself is not immune to nationalism's promptings. In a bizarre speech early this summer, he said: "I condemn and curse the BBC and Reuters for describing the P.K.K. as a 'militia group.' . . . If this attitude continues, the terror that hits the sons of this country today will hit them tomorrow."

Nationalism is now the most plausible alternative to the A.K.P. That will be a rude awakening to Turkey's traditional allies, who tend to assume that there remains a Kemalist "loyal opposition" that will somehow "tone down" the enthusiasms of the A.K.P. or that the country has the option of "going back" to the semidemocratic, westernizing regime that suited the purposes of the free world very well. The problem is that that regime did not always suit the purposes of Turkish society, which, anyway, has entered into a new era. The past century has turned Turkey inside out. The Ottoman Empire was a multicultural society under a Muslim government. The Turkish Republic is an overwhelmingly Islamic society in an officially secular state. The open question at the front of European and American minds is whether reforming that state according to society's wishes can lead to anything other than an Islamic republic.

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The Geopolitics of Turkey

By George Friedman

Rumors are floating in Washington and elsewhere that Turkey is preparing to move against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an anti-Turkish group seeking an independent Kurdistan in Turkey. One report, by Robert Novak in the Washington Post, says the United States is planning to collaborate with Turkey in suppressing the PKK in northern Iraq, an area the PKK has used as a safe-haven and launch pad to carry out attacks in Turkey.

The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and, to a small extent, Syria. The one thing all of these countries have agreed on historically is they have no desire to see an independent Kurdistan. Even though each has, on occasion, used Kurdish dissidents in other countries as levers against those countries, there always has been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.

Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK is part of the broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has created an area that is now under the effective governance of the Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the Iraqi Kurds will retain a high degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the Kurds in Iraq could become formally independent, creating a Kurdish state. Besides facing serious opposition from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions, that state would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become, by definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claim to other lands the Kurds regard as theirs.

This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an independent militia, the peshmerga, that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to carve out a surprising degree of independence within Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Turks were never comfortable with this policy and sent troops into Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt any moves toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started in 2003, however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops into northern Iraq in exchange for allowing the United States to use Turkish territory to launch into Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to lose a great deal of its mobility in the region.

The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution of events in Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an autonomous region in a federal Iraq or becomes an independent state as Iraq disintegrates is almost immaterial. It will become a Kurdish homeland and it will exist on the Turkish border. And that, from the Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat to Turkey.

Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given that Turkey did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American attitude toward Ankara has been complex, to say the least. On one hand, there was a sense of being let down by an old ally. On the other hand, given events in Iraq and U.S. relations with Iran and Syria, the United

States was not in a position to completely alienate a Muslim neighbor of Iraq.

As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans became even less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because its neutrality was important and partly because the United States was extremely concerned about Turkish reactions to growing Kurdish autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental national security issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in the Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time when the Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally pro-American, the United States could hardly let the Turks mangle them.

On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position to stop the Turks. The last thing the United States wanted was a confrontation with the Turks in the North, for military as well as political reasons. Yet, the other last thing it wanted was for other Iraqis to see that the United States would not protect them.

Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the Turkish-Kurdish equation. So what the United States did was a tap dance -- by negotiating a series of very temporary solutions that kept the Turks from crossing the line and kept the Kurds intact. The current crisis is over the status of the PKK in northern Iraq and, to a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds will gain too much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready to support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not prepared to force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to persuade them to give them up voluntarily. This negotiating process will buy time, though at this point the American strategy in Iraq generally has been reduced to buying time.

All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent Kurdistan. The real question concerns the position of Turkey as a regional power in the wake of the Iraq war. This is a vital question because of Iran. The assumption we have consistently made is that, absent the United States, Iran would become the dominant regional power and would be in a position, in the long term, to dominate the Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power but also potentially the global balance as well.

That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played since World War I -- an insular, defensive power that is cautious about making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that role, Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the Greeks in Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled in the chaos of the Middle Eastern equation -- and when it does become involved, it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.

That is not Turkey's traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa, Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three

continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much of the Eastern Hemisphere.

Turkey's contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and expansion of its power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging as a key power.

One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5 percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy of any Muslim country -- including Saudi Arabia.

And it has done this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is 109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being fourth in total GDP.

Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush, Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there is no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey's geographic position greatly enables it to become Europe's primary transit hub for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to reduce its dependence on Russia.

This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans, for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power, the Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region's two Muslim states -- and have managed to carve out for themselves a prominent position as regards other countries in the region as well. The country's economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the region away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic influence can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a supplement to its strategic relationship with Israel.

Turkey's problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example, its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its ability to influence events. Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara's influence.

As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As

important, Turkey's willingness to accept its highly constrained role indefinitely, while its economic -- and therefore political -- influence grows, is limited. Turkey's economic power, coupled with its substantial regional military power, will over time change the balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.

Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions, but its economy also is the major one in each of those regions, while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as well. When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It then becomes the leading power -- in many regions. That is what it means to be a pivotal power.

In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent. The United States is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq -- dubious for a number of reasons -- it will have to have a regional power to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and cautious with Turkey, but never as much as now -- while Turkey is growing economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not want to antagonize the Turks.

The United States and Iran have been talking -- just recently engaging in seven hours of formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United States will withdraw from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as it might. The United States has few levers to use against Iran. It is therefore not surprising that it has reached out to the biggest lever.

In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States, represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also specifically in Iraq. From the American point of view, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would introduce a major force native to the region that certainly would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq. This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence, though the United States has on several past occasions raised and then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak's article makes a great deal of sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for a Turkish intervention in Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey. Anything that blocks the Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish public, and even to Iran.

It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in the region, then it is in Turkey's interest to do so. It also is increasingly within Turkey's reach. But it must be understood that, given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a geographical position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around it.

For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now, however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey's slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role for Turkey -- and that will mean massive regional changes over time.

LETOÖN, XANTHUS AND PATARA


By John Freely

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The Western Mediterranean Coast of Turkey
Sev-Yay Press, Istanbul, 1997*

The Letoön was the principal sanctuary of ancient Lycia, dedicated to Leto, mother of Artemis and Apollo, the divine twins fathered by Zeus. According to one version of the myth—told by Ovid in Book VI of his *Metamorphoses*, Leto, fleeing from the jealous Hera, stopped here after the twins were born. Parched with thirst, she tried to drink from a pond. When the local peasants tried to stop her she turned them into frogs and doomed them to live forever in the pond. Ovid's narrator recounted the tale as follows:

I myself saw the pool and the place made famous by the wonder. For my father, who at that time was getting on in years and too weak to travel far, had bidden me to go and drive down from that country some choice steers which were grazing there, and had given me a man of that nation to serve as guide. While I fared through the grassy glades with him, there, in the midst of a lake, an ancient altar was standing, black with the fires of many sacrifices, surrounded with quivering reeds. My

THE LETOÖN



MAP IX


guide halted and said with awe-struck whisper: "Be merciful to me!" and in like whisper I said: "Be merciful!"

The guide then tells him of how Leto stopped to drink at the pool. When the local peasants tried to stop her she appealed to heaven and then turned her persecutors into frogs, condemning them to live forever in the pool:

Stretching up her hands to heaven, she cried: "Live then forever in that pool." It fell out as the goddess prayed. It is their delight to live in water; now to plunge their bodies quite beneath the enveloping pool, now to thrust forth their heads, now to swim upon the surface. Often they sit upon the sedgy bank and often leap back into the cool lake. But even now, as of old, they exercise their foul tongues in quarrel, and all shameless, though they may be underwater, even under the water they try to utter maledictions. Now also their voices are hoarse, their inflated throats swell up, and their constant quarreling distends their wide jaws; they stretch their ugly heads, the necks seem to have disappeared. Their backs are green; their bellies, the largest part of the body, are white; and as new-made frogs they leap in the muddy pool."

According to another version of the myth, when the peasants tried to prevent Leto from using the pool some wolves came to her aid and frightened the locals away so that she could drink. The pool from which she drank and then bathed Artemis and Apollo became a shrine protected by the Nymphs. Leto showed her gratitude to the wolves by changing the name of the country from Termilis to Lycia, which is derived from the Greek lykos, or wolf. Leto and her children were thenceforth the patron deities of Lycia, and the Letoön became the national shrine and place of assembly of the Lycian League.


The Letoön was discovered in 1838 by Charles Fellows, who explored the site the following year and again in 1841. George Bean first explored the site in 1946, when, as he writes in *Lycian Turkey*, "little was to be seen beyond a theater and a mass of blocks



Theater Entrance, the Letoön

marking the site of a temple." A French archaeological team under Professor Henri Metzger began excavating the site in 1962, clearing and identifying the monuments we see there today, as well as shedding much light on the history of the sanctuary. Among their discoveries was the remarkable trilingual inscription now in the Fethiye museum, which is dated to the reign of King Pixodarus of Caria (r. 340-334 B.C.). The text refers to the establishment at Xanthus of the cult of the deified King Caunus, mythical founder of the city that bears his name. It goes on to record the provisions for monthly and annual sacrifices, warning that those who violate the regulations will be guilty before Leto, her children and the Nymphs.

The approach road to the archaeological site ends at the theater, a handsome structure dating from the Hellenistic period, well preserved except for the total loss of its stage building. The cavea, which is more than a semicircle, is carved out of the hillside along the central sector of its arc, with the analemmata at the two ends built of smooth and regular ashlar blocks. Vaulted passageways on



The Agora, the Letoön


either side lead into the cavea, the one on the southwest decorated on its outer face with a row of sixteen theatrical masks, one of which represents Dionysus. Above the northeast entrance of the theater there is a handsome tomb on the hillside, its spacious interior formed from huge squared blocks smoothly finished. Between the tomb and the theater entrance there is a ten-meter stretch of early polygonal wall made with blocks measuring up to 1.5 meters in length.

The entrance to the fenced-in archaeological site is just to the right of the theater. Much of the site is below the level of the local water-table, and thus the excavation pits are flooded when they are not pumped out. One of these pits, which occupies the northern half of the site, has revealed the remains of two monumental stoas that originally enclosed the north and west sides of the sanctuary. The bases of the peripteral colonnades of the stoas are almost completely intact beneath the surface of the stagnant pool of moss-green water that has seeped into the excavation. The earliest of these is a Doric stoa erected in the Hellenistic period. Then in the

mid-first century B.C. an Ionic stoa was erected within the inner periphery of the Doric stoa, with a wall on the north enclosing the double portico. During the excavations of these stoas the remains of earlier shrines dating from the sixth to fourth century B.C. were unearthed beneath the porticoes. Under the north wall the archaeologists found thousands of marble fragments from ten statues of the second century B.C., five of which have been reassembled and are now on exhibit in the Antalya Museum.

Beyond the excavation pit of the stoas we come to the remains of a triad of temples that formed the heart of the Letoön. All three temples face south toward another half-submerged excavation pit that has revealed an enormous nymphaeum, which appears to have surrounded the pool where Leto drank and bathed Artemis and Apollo.

The temple on the west is the largest of the three, measuring 30.35 by 15.75 meters; it has been dated to the third century B.C. An inscription in Greek found in its cella records that it was dedicated to Leto. It was an Ionic temple with a peripteral colonnade




Triad of Temples, the Letoön


arranged with six columns on the ends and eleven on the sides. There are two columns *in antis* in the pronaos and engaged half-columns in the cella walls, with no opisthodomos.

The temple in the center is the smallest of the triad, measuring 18.20 by 8.70 meters; it is dated to the fifth or fourth century B.C., and has an inscription in Lycian recording that it was dedicated to Artemis. This was an Ionic templum-in-antis, its porch having two columns between the antae. Within the cella there is a strange structure of rough stone blocks around a rocky outcrop that has puzzled archaeologists, one possibility being that it is a sacred spot associated with the myth of Leto and her divine children. It has been suggested that this was the spot described by Ovid in Book VI of his *Metamorphoses*: "an ancient altar...black with the fires of many sacrifices, surrounded with quivering reeds."

The eastern temple measures 27.90 by 15.07 meters; it dates from the Hellenistic period, and was built over an earlier Lycian structure. It was a Doric temple with a peripteral colonnade having six columns on the ends and eleven on the sides, engaged half-



Mosaic in Temple of Apollo, the Letoön



Nymphaeum, the Letoön

columns in the cella walls, and two columns *in antis* in the pronaos, with no opisthodomos. At the center of the temple there is a perfectly preserved floor mosaic representing the symbols of Leto's children: the lyre of Apollo, the god of music, and the bow and arrow of Artemis—goddess of the hunt. It was near this temple that the French archaeologists discovered the trilingual inscription now in the Fethiye museum.

South of the three temples we come to the excavation pit of the nymphaeum, a structure in two parts which originally dates from the Hellenistic period and was enlarged and rebuilt in the Roman era, with further changes in early Byzantine times. The eastern part, which dates from the Roman period, consists of a rectangular marble basin oriented east-west between retaining walls some 16 meters apart. This section of the nymphaeum was rebuilt in the fourth century A.D. to create a church and monastery. The western end of this basin is joined to a semicircular structure with a pool 27 meters in diameter and four meters deep. Linked to the western end of the semicircular structure is a room, flanked by two exedrae, with niches

for statues. The large niche on the west has a dedicatory inscription to the emperor Hadrian. The entire nymphaeum was destroyed during the Arab invasions of Asia Minor, along with the temples and other structures of the sanctuary. The Letoön was then abandoned and almost vanished, until it was rediscovered by Fellows and excavated by the French archaeologists.

After seeing the Letoön we can make an excursion to the site of ancient Pydnae before returning to the main highway. Pydnae is on the coast about ten kilometers from the Letoön on a good road. The site, known as Gâvur Ağılı (the Place of the Infidels), is a hilltop above Zeytin Burnu, the Cape of Olives.

Pydnae was not a town, but a fortress. Captain Francis Beaufort discovered it when charting the southern coast of Turkey in 1811 for the British Admiralty. Fellows explored the site in 1838, and noted that it reminded him of one of the reliefs of the walled towns in the Royal Tomb at Pinara. He reasoned that it had been a stronghold of the Xanthians, and that their garrison had lived there in wicker huts or tents. The fortress is built on the slope of a hill leading down to the sea, with a ring wall enclosing an area measuring some 200 by 150 meters. The fortification extends down from the top of the hill on either side of the enclosed area almost to the sea, where the two arms are linked by a wall along the shore. The wall is almost one meter thick and is strengthened at intervals by two-storied defense towers, which are still standing to a height of nearly ten meters, with gates at the east and north corners. The only structure in the interior of the fortress is a Byzantine chapel in the east corner.

We now return to highway 400, which about one kilometer beyond the Letoön turnoff crosses the Xanthus river and brings us to the village of Kınık. At the first crossroads within the village we turn left to approach the site of ancient Xanthus, whose ruins are just a short distance down the road.

Archaeological finds on the acropolis of Xanthus show that the site was first inhabited in the eighth century B.C. The city took its name from the river Xanthus, which in Greek means "blond," its color coming from the silt that the stream bears down to the sea

from the Lycian mountains. The Lycian river Xanthus (there is also one of the same name in the Troad) is mentioned by Homer on numerous occasions in the *Iliad*, usually in connection with Sarpedon and his cousin Glaucus, leaders of the Lycians who fought as allies of King Priam. One such incident is described in Book V of the *Iliad*, where Sarpedon speaks to Hector:

I have come, a companion to help you, from a very far place;
Lykia lies very far away, by the whirling waters of Xanthus;
there I left behind my own wife and my baby son,
there I left my many possessions which the needy man eyes
longingly.

Yet even so I drive on my Lykians, and myself have courage
to fight my man in battle, though there is nothing of mine here
that the Achaians can carry off as spoil or drive off.

Sarpedon never returned to Lycia, for he was struck down and killed by Patroclus. Homer writes of this in Book XVI of the *Iliad*, where Glaucus speaks of his fallen cousin: "Sarpedon has fallen, the lord of the shield-armoured Lykians, who defended Lykia in his strength and the right of his justice."

Strabo refers to Xanthus as "the largest city in Lycia," one of the six members of the Lycian League that had the maximum number of three votes. The earliest reference to the city is by Herodotus, who in Book I of his *Histories* describes the conquest of Lycia by Harpagus the Mede after the fall of Sardis in 546 B.C.:

When Harpagus advanced into the plain of Xanthus, they met him in battle, though greatly outnumbered, and fought with much gallantry; at length, however, they were defeated and forced to withdraw within their walls, whereupon they collected their women, children, slaves and other property and shut them up in the citadel, set fire to it and burnt it to the ground. Then having sworn to do so, they marched out to meet the enemy and were killed to a man. Many of the Lycians who claim to be Xanthians are foreign immigrants, except eighty families

who happened on that occasion to be away from home and consequently survived.

The people of Xanthus resisted just as valiantly in 42 B.C., when their city was besieged by a Roman army under Brutus. Once again the Xanthians refused to surrender, setting fire to their city and committing suicide en masse, an episode described by Plutarch in his *Life of Brutus*:

Brutus...sent horsemen against them while they were at breakfast, and these slew six hundred of them; next he took their strongholds and villages, but dismissed all his captives without ransom, in order that he might win over the people by kindness. They were obstinate, however, feeding their anger upon their injuries, and despising his clemency and kindness, until he drove the most warlike of them into Xanthus and laid siege to the city. They tried to escape by swimming under the surface of the river which flowed past the city. But they were caught in nets which were let down deep across the channel; the tops of these had bells attached to them which indicated at once when anyone was entangled. Then the Xanthians made a sally by night and set fire to some of the siege-engines, but they were perceived by the Romans and driven back to their walls; and when a brisk wind fanned the flames back towards the battlements and some of the adjoining houses caught fire, Brutus, fearing for the safety of the city, ordered his men to assist in putting out the fire.

But the Lycians were suddenly possessed by a dreadful and indescribable impulse to madness, which can be likened best to a passion for death. At any rate, all ages of them, freemen and slaves with their wives and children, shot missiles from the walls at the enemy who were helping them to combat the flames, and with their own hands brought up reeds and wood and all manner of combustibles, and so spread the fire over the city, feeding it with all sorts of material and increasing its strength and fury in every way. When the flames had darted forth and encircled the city on all sides, and blazed out mightily, Brutus, distressed at what was going on, rode round outside the city in his eagerness to help, and with outstretched hands begged the Xanthians to spare

and save their city. No one heeded him, however, but all sought in every way to destroy themselves, men and women alike; nay, even the little children with shouts and shrieks either leaped into the fire, or threw themselves headlong from the walls, or cast themselves beneath their fathers' swords, baring their throats and begging to be smitten. After the city had been thus destroyed, a woman was seen dangling in a noose; she had a dead child fastened to her neck, and with a blazing torch was trying to set fire to her dwelling. So tragic was the spectacle that Brutus could not bear to see it, and burst into tears on hearing of it; he also proclaimed a prize for any soldier who should succeed in saving the life of a Lycian. But there were only a hundred and fifty, we are told, who did not escape such preservation. So then the Xanthians, after long lapse of time, as though fulfilling a period set by fate for their destruction, had the boldness to renew the calamity of their ancestors; for these too, in the time of the Persian wars, had likewise burned down their city and destroyed themselves.

This was not the end of Xanthus, which was eventually rebuilt upon the same site, its fortunes reviving so that in imperial Roman times it once again became the leading city of Lycia. It survived on into the Byzantine era as a bishopric under the Metropolitan of Myra. But then Xanthus was destroyed during the Arab invasions and disappeared from history. Charles Fellows discovered the ruins of Xanthus in 1838 and returned to excavate the site in three campaigns between 1839 and 1844. As he wrote in his journal when he returned to Xanthus for the first time in 1839:

I am once again at my favourite city—the first in which I became acquainted with the remains of art of the ancient Lycians, and in which I hope to find still more, embodying their language and history and poetic sculpture....How might the classic enthusiast revel in the charms of this city and its neighbours, with Mount Cragus before him, he might conjure up all the chimaeras of its fabulous history.

Fellows shipped all of the important works of art he found back

to England, where they are now on exhibit in the British Museum. The most notable of these is the Nereid Monument, a surpassingly beautiful structure of the fifth century B.C. in the form of an Ionic temple. This takes its name from the water goddesses known as the Nereids, whose statues stand between the columns on all sides of the mausoleum. Xanthus then lay undisturbed until 1950, when a team of French archaeologists began digging here. This expedition has now unearthed structures and other antiquities covering the entire span of the existence of Xanthus, ranging from the original Lycian fortress town of the eighth century B.C. to the Byzantine bishopric of the twelfth century A.D. Here, as elsewhere in Lycia, the most interesting remains are the funerary monuments, although these are now stripped of their original sculptural decoration.

The Nereid Monument stood on the high hill to the right of the main gate to Xanthus on the south, where the road from the valley below enters the ancient city. The mausoleum had been thrown down by an earthquake and its fragments lay scattered over the hillside, where Fellows gathered them together and shipped them off to England.

The approach road takes us past the fragmentary remains of the south gate of the Hellenistic city. The gateway bears an inscription of the Seleucid king Antiochus III dated 197 B.C. Just beyond this is the well-preserved Arch of Vespasian (r. 69-79), which stands astride a stretch of the ancient roadway that led from Xanthus to the Letoön and Pinara.

We continue along the road, passing on our left a stretch of Hellenistic wall connected with the southeastern corner of the Lycian acropolis, where the citadel of the city was located during the archaic and classical periods. During the Hellenistic and Roman periods the citadel was on a second acropolis hill that rises on the northern side of the site. Beyond the Lycian acropolis on the left side of the road are the theater and the Roman agora. Opposite the agora on the right is the entrance to the car park, where we begin our exploration of the ancient city.


The Roman agora, which dates from the second or third century



Hellenistic Gateway, Xanthus

XANTHUS

0 meters 300



MAP X




Xanthian Stele, Xanthus

A.D., covered a square area about 50 meters on a side, surrounded by porticoes with unfluted columns standing on pedestals. Within the southwestern corner of the square there are the ruins of a Byzantine basilica with side aisles; the north part of the church consisted of three chambers with mosaic pavements, one of them apparently being the baptistery.

Beside the road at the northeast corner of the agora we see the so-called Xanthian Stele. This is a pillar tomb with the longest Lycian inscription known, running to over 250 lines, including a twelve-line Greek poem. This inscription, which has been played an important role in the decipherment of the Lycian language, is an important source of our knowledge of Lycian history in the last third of the fifth century B.C. The inscription records that this was the tomb of a Lycian king named Khirei, who is represented on Xanthian coins of the late fifth century B.C. Parts of the pillar and its inscription are in the Istanbul Archaeological Museum and the British Museum.

Beside the road near the southeast corner of the agora we see a Lycian tomb of the house type standing on a high stepped platform. The grave chamber, or hypsorium, is entered at the east foot of the monument. The tomb is dated tentatively to the fifth or fourth century B.C.

There is a particularly striking group of three tombs between the southwest corner of the agora and the corresponding corner of the theater. The one on the north, nearest the agora, is the famous Harpy Tomb. The tomb itself was carved out of the top of a limestone monolith resting on a rectangular base made of a single stone, with a roof composed of three stone slabs increasing in area from bottom to top, the total height being 7.62 meters. The tomb chamber was originally faced with marble slabs carved in low relief. The reliefs were removed by Fellows and are now in the British Museum; those now on the monument are cement casts of the original put in place in 1957. The tomb took its name from the bird-women at either end of the reliefs on the north and south sides; these were originally thought to be Harpies, who in the *Iliad* carry off the




Pillar Tomb on Acropolis, Xanthus

children of the slain Lycian hero Pandaros, but now authorities tend to identify them as Sirens, the female demons who fly away with the souls of the dead. The reliefs are dated to the decade 480-470 B.C., and bear a close resemblance to Ionian works of that period. It is believed that the tomb belonged to the ruling family of Xanthus at that time.

The monument just to the north of the Harpy Tomb consists of a stumpy pillar tomb with a thick lid of three tiers, surmounted by a Lycian sarcophagus with its own characteristic lid. The pillar tomb contained an untouched burial of the third century B.C. On the outside surface of the monument there was an archaic relief slab of the sixth century B.C. now in the Istanbul Archaeological Museum. The sarcophagus is dated to the Hellenistic period, and it is evident that both it and the relief slab on the pillar tomb were taken from elsewhere and reused in this unique monument.


The third monument in this group is a little farther to the south of the previous one. This is in the form of a tower containing a funerary chamber, which has been dated to the imperial Roman era.



Lycian Sarcophagus above Theater, Xanthus

The theater is built up against the north face of the Lycian acropolis, facing north toward the agora. An inscription records that a huge donation was made by the philanthropist Opramoas of Rhodiapolis specifically "for the construction of the theater," which dates it to the mid-second century A.D. The tiers of seats are well preserved, but they were originally more numerous, for those in the front were used to make way for a barrier around the orchestra, while many in the rear were removed for the construction of the Byzantine defense wall. The orchestra is presently full of stone blocks from the stage building; this was originally in two stories, of which part of the front wall is still standing. An arch on the east opens into a parados leading into the orchestra; the corresponding opening on the west was inserted merely for symmetry and does not lead to an actual passageway.

Above the theater to its south is the Lycian acropolis, the original citadel of Xanthus. The wall on that side of the acropolis dates from the Byzantine period, with numerous ancient architectural fragments used in its construction. Pottery shards from the geomet-



Theater, Xanthus

ric period indicate that the earliest habitation on the acropolis was ca. 800 B.C. The French excavations have unearthed numerous foundations ranging over a wide span of time. At the northeast corner of the acropolis we see a funerary monument known as the Pillar of the Theater. This originally stood near the theater; in the Byzantine period it was built into the defense tower at the northeast corner of the acropolis. There is a Lycian inscription on the west side of the pillar, while on its east side there is an inscription in Greek recording the moving of the monument. The foundations that we see in this corner of the acropolis are those of a Byzantine church and monastery. The oldest ruins on the acropolis are in the southwest corner, probably remnants of royal palaces from the archaic period. At the summit of the acropolis, beneath the ruins of a Byzantine structure, the French archaeologists have unearthed the base of a temple dedicated to a Lycian goddess, whose cult was amalgamated with that of Artemis. Another sanctuary that would have been here was the Sarpedoneion, a heroon dedicated to the mythical founder of the Lycian dynasty, whose shrine is mentioned by Appian in his account of the siege of Xanthus by Brutus in 42 B.C.

The southwestern corner of the Lycian acropolis was walled off in the Byzantine period to create a keep with an enclosure wall fortified by towers. A number of ancient structures were demolished to construct this keep, with their fragments built into the fortification walls. Among these were reliefs recovered by Fellows and sent back to England, where they are exhibited in the British Museum along with the other Xanthian sculptures. The reliefs recovered here include representations of war chariots, a procession of horsemen, and a funerary scene, all dated to the fifth century B.C.

We now explore the part of the site to the east of the car park, on the slope of the northern acropolis hill. When the city expanded into this part of the site in the Hellenistic period a new circuit of defense walls was erected, enclosing the area south of the northern acropolis. These walls were repaired on several occasions on into

the Byzantine era, using building blocks and other architectural fragments from earlier structures.

We now follow a path that leads eastward from the car park, and after a walk of about 200 meters we come to the site of the Hellenistic agora. East of this we find the remains of a large basilica recently excavated by the French archaeologists. The basilica was erected in the Roman imperial era, and after being abandoned in late antiquity it was converted into a church in the medieval Byzantine period. The church was preceded by a narthex; from there three portals led into the central nave and the side aisles, terminating at the east in a semicircular apse with a raised synthronon. A fragment of the mosaic pavement of the nave can be seen in the western part of the basilica. Nearby there is a smaller Byzantine chapel half hidden in the underbrush, awaiting excavation.

We now continue eastward as far as the Hellenistic walls, after which we begin climbing uphill. This takes us into the Hellenistic necropolis, where the ascent becomes somewhat arduous because of the debris of fallen funerary monuments and the dense underbrush. The most notable monument that we come to is the so-called Sarcophagus of the Dancers. This is a pillar tomb that was surmounted by a sarcophagus, similar to the monument beside the Harpy Tomb. The monument here takes its name from the reliefs on the two ends of the sarcophagus lid, which is now lying on the ground. The ogival-arched ends are divided into two compartments by a pilaster, and in each of these there is the figure of a dancing maiden. The two on the north side are standing poised motionless on tiptoe, while the other two are whirling around. The two curved surfaces of the sarcophagus lid also have reliefs, the east side decorated with a scene of battle and the west with a boar hunt. The sides of the pillars have reliefs showing lions attacking bulls.

Continuing uphill, we come to a gateway in the northeast corner of the Hellenistic walls. Beside the gate we find the remains of another pillar tomb, known as the Lion Pillar. The pillar, which is now toppled on the ground, was once surmounted by a sculptured frieze and a sarcophagus, both of which were shipped to England

by Fellows and are now in the British Museum. The tomb took its name from the reliefs of lions on two sides of the pillar. This is believed to be the oldest monument in Xanthus, dated to the second quarter of the sixth century B.C.

Continuing uphill inside the walls, we come to the remains of the Tomb of Payava. When Fellows first came upon this monument in 1838 he remarked that "This is the most beautiful of all the tombs!" The monument consisted of a three-stepped platform and a plinth supporting a frieze and a magnificent Lycian sarcophagus. The frieze and the sarcophagus were shipped off to England by Fellows in 1840 and are now in the British Museum. The tomb takes its name from a Lycian inscription on the sarcophagus that reads, "Payava built this monument;" it is dated by another inscription mentioning Autophradates, a Persian satrap of Lydia, who may have been tyrant in Xanthus in the years 375-362 B.C. All that remains on the site now are the platform, the plinth, and the stone base of the sarcophagus from which the frieze was stripped.

On the slope above the Payava Tomb we see the most conspicuous monument in the necropolis, the Acropolis Pillar. This is a tall pillar tomb standing on a stepped base above a rock outcropping surrounded by rock-hewn tombs and sarcophagi. The grave chamber is hollowed out of the upper section of the pillar, with stepped marble slabs placed above it as a roof after the body had been lowered into the tomb. The small entrance door on the north side of the grave chamber had a symbolic function only, placed there to permit the passage of the deceased's spirit from the tomb.

We now cross over the Hellenistic walls to look at the tombs just outside the city limits. The first of these is a fragmentary sarcophagus standing on a stepped base that has been carved out of the rock of the hillside. Because of the steep slope of the hill, the base has one step at the back, two at the sides, and three in front. Fragments of the lid have been removed to the Istanbul Archaeological Museum, leaving only the sarcophagus itself, still standing on its base. The south side of the sarcophagus is decorated with a relief showing two lions devouring a bull. The lid of the sarcophagus has

scenes of a banquet and hunts on its sides and sphinxes on its ends. These reliefs indicate a date in the fifth century B.C., making this the oldest sarcophagus in Xanthus.

A short way higher up the slope we come to the remains of the Tomb of Merehi, a half-toppled sarcophagus that has lost its lid. The sarcophagus was discovered in 1840 by Fellows "beneath the rocks at the back of the city," where it had been displaced from its base by an earthquake, its lid half-buried in the earth. Fellows originally called it the Chimaera Tomb, because of the relief on its lid. This relief, which is now in the British Museum, shows a warrior and a charioteer in a quadriga hunting down the Chimaera, a lioness with a goat's head projecting from her back. A Lycian inscription on the burial chamber thus identifies the builder of the tomb: "This monument [is] built [by] Merehi, son of Cydalos Kandalos, of the race of Triatarbas, for his household; he was a captain of Caricas." The Tomb of Merehi is dated to the fourth century B.C. from the style of the reliefs with which it is decorated, the scene representing the hunting of the Chimaera suggesting that the deceased was a dynast who traced his descent from Bellerophon.


We now make our way up to the summit of the acropolis hill, where the only remains of note are the ruins of a large Byzantine basilica and monastery. Architectural fragments found in the vicinity indicate that the basilica was built on and from the ruins of a Roman temple. The climb to the summit is well worth the effort for the superb view it affords of the ancient city and its environs, with the Xanthus river winding its way to the sea through what Homer called the "rich countryside of Lycia."

We now return to highway 400, following the Xanthus on the last stretch of its meandering flow to the sea. Some eight kilometers beyond Kınık we turn off to the right on a road signposted for Patara, a drive of six kilometers down toward the sea. As we come within sight of the Mediterranean we see the ruins of Patara scattered forlornly around its desolate site—a salt marsh that was once the harbor of the ancient city, one long since silted up by the Xanthus river.

Patara was the port of Xanthus; nevertheless it was a city in its own right, entitled to the maximum quota of three votes in the Lycian League. The city was famous for its oracle of Apollo, which is mentioned by Herodotus in Book I of his *Histories*. Patara is also mentioned by Plutarch in his *Life of Brutus*, where he describes how the people of the city were persuaded to give in to the Romans in 42 B.C. Immediately after the Xanthians had committed suicide en masse rather than surrender.

When Brutus saw that the city of Patara was holding out strongly against him, he hesitated to attack it, and was in perplexity, fearing that it would be afflicted with the same madness; but as he held some of its women prisoners of war, he released them without ransom. They were the wives and daughters of prominent men, and by rehearsing the praises of Brutus, calling him a man of the greatest moderation and justice, they persuaded them to yield and surrender their city. Consequently all the rest of the Lycians came and entrusted themselves to him, and found that his goodness and kindness exceeded their hopes.

Patara is mentioned in *Acts of the Apostles*, where it is recorded that Paul, accompanied by Luke, stopped here to change ships on his third missionary journey, one that he made in about the year A.D. 57. Early in the Byzantine era Patara was elevated to the status of a metropolis. Its most renowned son was St. Gregory Thaumaturgos, the Miracle-Worker, who was born here ca. 300. The city continued in existence through the Byzantine era, in the latter part of which it was a port of call for pilgrims going to and from the Holy Land. It then declined when its port became silted up, and eventually it was abandoned and fell into ruins, the remains of its surviving edifices sinking beneath the drifting sand dunes. The ancient city was rediscovered by Captain Francis Beaufort, who in 1811-12 made a voyage of exploration along the coast for the British Admiralty in HMS *Frederikssteen*. Beaufort describes the scene at Patara in his *Karamania*, another classic in the travel literature on Asia Minor, which was published in 1818:



Gateway of Mettius Modestus, Patara

This place, once a celebrated oracle of Apollo, still preserves its former name, and many traces of its former grandeur....It is evident from both Strabo and Livy that Patara formerly had a harbour; the situation is still apparent, but at present it is a swamp, choked up with sand and bushes, and all communication with the sea cut off by a straight beach, through which there is no opening....The sand has not only filled up the harbour, but has accumulated to a considerable height between the ruins and the river Xanthus....Patara is now uninhabited; but a few solitary peasants were found tending the cattle that had wandered about the plain.


Charles Fellows first explored the site in 1838. He and his party visited it again in 1842, when HMS *Beacon* was anchored off Patara while it was loaded with the antiquities from Xanthus that were taken back to England. Fellows describes the scene as follows:

This morning we rode down the plain to Patara, which place I had

PATARA

0 meters 250

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MAP XI


visited before. I again sought the places of the greatest interest—its very perfect theater, the arched entrance to the city, its cluster of palm-trees, and, owing to the drier state of the swamp, I was enabled to visit a beautiful small temple about the centre of the ruined city: its doorway, within a portico in antis, is in high preservation, as well as its walls; the doorway is of beautiful Greek workmanship, in the Corinthian style, in fine proportion and scale; its height is about twenty-four feet.

The approach road brings us to what Fellows described as “the arched entryway of the city.” This is a perfectly preserved Roman propylon with three great round-arched portals, its dedicatory inscription recording that it was erected by “the people of Patara, metropolis of the Lycian nation.” Beside the arches on both sides of the gateway are six consoles that once carried portrait busts of Mettius Modestus, governor of the province of Lycia-Pamphylia, and members of his family. Near the gateway there are several well-preserved sarcophagi of the Roman imperial era.

Just to the west and slightly south of the gateway there is a low mound. This has never been properly excavated, although archaeologists have found here a colossal head of Apollo and shards of Attic pottery of the classical period. This has led some authorities to suggest that the mound is the site of the celebrated temple of Apollo and its oracle. The earliest mention of this shrine is by Herodotus, who writes of “the Lycian town of Patara, where the priestess who delivers the oracles...is shut up in the temple during the night.” According to mythology, this oracle was the one consulted by King Telephus of Mysia after he was wounded by Achilles. One authority for this tradition is Pausanias, who writes that “the Lykians at Patara show you a bronze urn in the temple of Apollo which they say was dedicated by Telephos and made by Hephaistos....” The shrine is mentioned by Ovid in his *Metamorphoses*, where Apollo tells of how one of Cupid’s arrows struck him and caused him to fall in love with Daphne. At the end of this tale Apollo, who here refers to himself as “lord of Delphi, of Claros, Tenedos, and royal Patara,” exclaims in mock sadness, “Ah me! for



Arch of Roman Bath, Patara




Corinthian Temple, Patara

no herb can remedy love, the art which heals all but cannot heal its master."

At the southern foot of the mound there are remains of a Roman bath. South of this are the fragmentary remains of a basilica. West of the basilica a line of defense walls leads south to another Roman bath, whose dedicatory inscription identifies it as an endowment of the emperor Vespasian.

About 250 meters west of the basilica we see the remains of the temple mentioned by Fellows. This is a small templum-in-antis on a platform measuring 13 by 16 meters, with the cella wall standing to a height of 20.3 meters, and with a perfectly preserved door 6.1 meters high between the pronaos and naos. The temple, which has a rich stucco decoration, is dated to the second century A.D. It stands at the eastern foot of the low acropolis hill, which is surrounded by walls erected in the Hellenistic period and repaired in the Byzantine era.

We now continue along the road as far as a path on the right that leads to the theater, the most impressive monument in Patara. The



Theater, Patara

original structure probably dates from the Hellenistic period; inscriptions record a repair in the reign of Tiberius (r. 13-37) and a reconstruction in 147, during the reign of Antoninus Pius. The cavea has been carved from the northern side of a hill that rises above the beach. Sand has drifted into the theater and covered the stage building and orchestra along with many of the lower seats. The continued drifting of sand has covered parts of the structure that were visible at the time of Beaufort's visit to Patara in 1811, as is evident from his description:

[The theater] is somewhat more than a semicircle, whose external diameter is more than two hundred feet; it contains thirty-four rows of seats, few of which have been disturbed, but the superior preservation of the proscenium distinguishes it from most ancient theatres which are extant and would render it well worthy of more minute architectural detail. At the eastern entrance there is a very long and very perfect inscription, recording the building of the theater by Q. Velius Titianus; and the dedication by his daughter Velia Procla, in the fourth consulate of the Emperor Antoninus Pius.

It is an easy climb from the upper tier of the theater to the top of the hill behind it, from which we have a sweeping view of the entire site. The most notable structure on the summit is a circular pit about nine meters in diameter and nearly nine meters deep, the lower part of the cylinder being cut from the bed-rock and in the upper part the gaps in the rock being filled with small stones set in mortar. A steep flight of rock-hewn steps with a hairpin turn leads to the bottom. In the center of the pit there is a square pillar of masonry, which at present rises 1.8 meters above the ground level at the top of the hill. It is generally thought that the pit was a cistern and fountain-house, with the central pillar supporting a wooden roof that provided shelter and shade for those drawing water here.

On the western side of the hill we see the stylobate of a small temple that some scholars believe was dedicated to Athena. This

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has not been excavated, and so there is no definite evidence concerning its architectural type, date or dedication.

We now make our way though the sand dunes along the beach to explore the western side of the site, passing the marsh that occupies the area of the ancient harbor. About 700 meters west of the hill there are the foundations of a circular structure with a rectangular base. George Bean tentatively identified this as a lighthouse, which would have stood on the western side of the harbor entrance, but now it is noted on most archaeological maps of the site as a tomb.

We now walk inland along what was once the western side of the harbor. The most conspicuous structure on this side of the site is an enormous granary endowed by Hadrian, identified by a Latin inscription on the façade. The building, which is intact except for its roof, measures some 70 by 27 meters in plan, divided by cross-walls into eight identical rooms that were originally vaulted. Eight doors on the east side lead into the rooms, which are also connected with one another internally. The façade is in two stories separated by a cornice, with a window in the upper story above each of the doors in the façade. The interior seems only to have had a single story. Above each door are a pair of consoles similar to those on the main gate of the city, presumably designed for portrait busts. The two central consoles would have supported busts of Hadrian and his wife Sabina, who visited Patara in A.D. 129. At that time the Emperor endowed this building as a storehouse for the grain that passed through the port.

Just to the southwest of the granary there are foundations that may be the remains of the agora, but this area has not been excavated.

A short distance north of the granary are the ruins of a once-handsome built tomb of the imperial Roman era. This was designed in the form of a pseudo-peripteral Corinthian temple, with four columns in its porch, approached by steps from the harbor side. One wall of the mausoleum is still standing, with four engaged half-columns on its outer face, still carrying one course of the vaulted roof with its coffered panels. The presence of other tombs

and sarcophagi in the vicinity indicate that this area was the necropolis of Patara.

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We now return to highway 400, which ten kilometers past the Patara turnoff brings us to Kalkan, a pretty little seaport that has in recent years become a popular seaside resort, a port of call on the Mavi Yol. Some 27 kilometers farther along we come to Kaş, another picturesque little port that has also become a popular resort and a stopping place on the Mavi Yol. This is a convenient place to end this second itinerary through Lycia, which has taken us down the Xanthus valley to the mid-point of the Lycian shore.

Turkey: Re-evaluating the U.S. Alliance

Summary

A pending resolution before the U.S. Congress that calls the 1915 killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks genocide has brought to light a growing strain in U.S.-Turkish relations. This latest episode seriously threatens to complicate U.S. military logistics into Iraq should Turkey carry out threats to limit U.S. access to the air base in the southeastern Turkish city of Incirlik. The Armenian genocide issue, as well as U.S. protests over Turkish incursions into northern Iraq to crush Kurdish rebels, strike at the core of Turkish geopolitics, and will push Ankara into re-evaluating its long-standing alliance with the United States.

Analysis

New U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen called up his Turkish counterpart, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, on Oct. 15 to discuss the repercussions to U.S.-Turkish relations from the proposed Armenian bill before the U.S. Congress. The bill labels the 1915 massacre of Armenians by Ottoman Turks genocide. The big fear in the Pentagon is that if the resolution passes, Turkey will follow through with threats to further limit use of Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey for support of operations in Iraq.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the current strain between Washington and Ankara with a Turkish idiom, saying recently, "Where the rope is worn thin, may it break off." Such big threats coming out of Ankara over a symbolic resolution on an event that occurred almost a century ago might seem odd at first glance. But they become clearer once it is understood that the Armenian issue, as well as Turkey's military push into northern Iraq against Kurdish rebels, are issues that cut to the heart of Turkish geopolitics -- and thus carry significant implications for the future of U.S.-Turkish relations.

Prior to World War I, Turkey was a model multiethnic and multireligious empire that commanded the Mediterranean and Black Sea trade routes. The Ottoman Empire was the geopolitical pivot between Europe, Russia and Persia, allowing it to develop into a global economic and military power. The outcome of World War I, however, drastically altered the geopolitical landscape of the region as the West infected the empire with ethnic nationalism that broke the bonds of Ottoman control. Turkey then faced a choice: Try (and fail) to continue as a multiethnic empire as its minorities broke away, or jump on the bandwagon and consolidate its own emerging nationalism. It chose the latter. The geography of Turkey is not amenable to clearly defined borders, however, which meant the birth of the modern Turkish republic defined by nationality inevitably would entail ugly episodes such as the 1915 Armenian mass killings and repeated killing of Kurds in order to solidify a self-sufficient Turkish state.

TURKEY'S GEOPOLITICAL NEIGHBORHOOD



This takes us back to a pivotal point in Turkish history: the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which sealed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the victorious European powers drew up a treaty to dismember the Ottoman Empire by ceding territory to Greece (including the key northern shore of the Dardanelles), giving Armenia more territory than it could manage and creating the conditions for an independent Kurdish state. The West, in essence, had abolished Turkish sovereignty.

These were, of course, unacceptable terms to the Turks, who then spent the next three years regaining their territory from the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds and reversing the terms of the treaty to ensure the survival of the Turkish nation-state as opposed to the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. But the damage had still been done. To this day, Turkey is locked into a sort of Sevres syndrome, under which any Western interference in Turkey's ethnic minority issues must be confronted as long as Turkey defines itself by its nationality. So, if Turkey feels the need to set up a solid buffer zone along its border with northern Iraq to contain the Kurds and swoop in with troops when it sees fit, there is little the United States can do to stop it.

The same argument was taking place in Turkey following the 1991 Gulf War, when the Iraqi Kurds were granted autonomy. Soon enough, Turkey in 1995 sent 35,000 troops into northern Iraq to crush Kurdish rebels and squash Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for independence. The same episode is repeating itself today, as Iraqi Kurdistan has made strides in attracting foreign investment and extending its autonomy since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Turkey opposed the invasion by refusing U.S. access to Turkish military bases, and now is threatening to set up roadblocks along the U.S. military's logistics chain into Iraq and upset Washington's relations with the Kurds.

And this probably is just the beginning. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's neighborhood -- and its relationship with Washington -- has drastically changed. Attempts to become a Central Asian or European power have failed, and the Turks are looking in different directions for opportunities. The Iraq war has proven that U.S. and Turkish security concerns are no longer in lockstep, leading Turkey to re-evaluate its alliance with the United States.

From the Turks' viewpoint, the United States can no longer be viewed as a stabilizing force, as it has been since World War II. Moreover, Turkey no longer is a weak economic force and is not as reliant on the United States for its security. Turkey's rapid economic growth and its strong military tradition are creating the conditions for Ankara to pull itself out of its post-

World War I insularity and extend itself in the region once again. As a result, Turkey's foreign policy no longer needs to tie itself to the United States, and Ankara can afford to make bold moves concerning issues -- whether those issues relate to the Kurds, Armenians or Greeks -- without losing too much sleep over any follow-on damage to its relationship with the United States. If the United States is going to act as the destabilizing force in the region through creating a major upheaval in Iraq, Turkey must at the very least attempt to take control of the situations within its old sphere of influence.

But this does not mean Turkey can make a clean break from the United States either, at least not any time in the near future. Turkey's growth is still fragile and needs more time to become consolidated. Turkey also faces resistance in every direction that it pushes, from Greece in the Balkans, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East and Russia in the Caucasus. Turkey's current position puts it into a geopolitical context where Iran is rising to Turkey's southeast and a resurgent Russia is bearing down on the Caucasus and even hinting at returning its naval fleet to the Mediterranean. In the near term, a major power is needed in Iraq to keep the Iranians at bay, and the Turks would prefer that the Americans do the heavy lifting on this since Iraq already is in disarray. Meanwhile, Turkey will move forward with its grand strategy of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check.

